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We propose a generalized metanorms game (GMG) that integrates both punishment and reward 
in order to analyze the evolution of cooperation in public goods games. Axelrod (1986) developed a 
meta-punishment game in which players can punish those who do not punish non-cooperators as 
well as those who do not cooperate. We have expanded this original game to include a 
meta-rewarding part whereby players can reward those who reward cooperators as well as those who 
cooperate. The meta-punishment part of the GMG is suitable for modeling order formations in 
groups to formalize typical public goods games, while the meta-rewarding part is suitable for public 
goods games in which punishments have no efficacy. For example, it is almost impossible for 
participants who do not provide information to be punished in knowledge-sharing communities on 
the Internet, and thus, a framework that includes reward is needed for analyzing the evolution of 
cooperation. 
We performed simulations to clarify the conditions needed to dominate cooperation using GMG. 
In the meta-punishment part, there is an equilibrium point in which cooperation dominates, but it is 
unstable, and cooperation eventually collapses in the long term. In the meta-rewarding part, on the 
other hand, cooperation dominates robustly. We install Social Indicator (SI) in order to promote 
cooperation in the game. SI is an agent with a fixed and controlled strategy and exists slightly in a 
group. We tested four types of SIs in the meta-punishment part: (1) always cooperate but never 
punish the others, (2) always cooperate and always punish the others, (3) always defect and never 
punish, and (4) always defect and always punish the others. Surprisingly, the SIs that always defect 
(types 3 and 4) are needed for keeping the cooperation robust. The existence of these SIs enables 
players to recognize the necessity of punishment for defectors, and thus, free riders for punishment 
cannot invade. We also use four types of SIs in the meta-rewarding part: (1) always cooperate but 
never reward the others, (2) always cooperate and always reward the others, (3) always defect and 
never reward, and (4) always defect and always reward the others. SIs that rewarded only (type 4) 
have a negative effect on cooperation. We find that specific SIs do not contribute directly for 
cooperation, but contribute indirectly by preparing environment which lets players recognize the 
necessity of punishment or reward. 
[1] Axelrod, R.M., An Evolutionary Approach to Norms, American Political Science Review, 80 (4), 
1095-1111, 1986. 
                Hitoshi Yamamoto
   Faculty of Business Administration
           Rissho University (Japan)
<hitoshi.yamamoto@mbm.nifty.com>
                 Isamu Okada
Faculty of Business Administration
        Soka University (Japan)
           <okada@soka.ac.jp>
             Fujio Toriumi
The University of Tokyo (Japan)
     <tori@sys.t.u-tokyo.ac.jp>
Miguel, Amblard, Barceló & Madella (eds.) Advances in Computational Social Science and Social Simulation
Barcelona: Autònoma University of Barcelona, 2014, DDD repository <http://ddd.uab.cat/record/125597>
